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THE FOURTEEN TRANSFORMATIVE
WORDS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
FROM FEAR TO THE "COURAGE TO BE
FREE"
Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment,




Every great idea-whether embodied in a speech, a mathematical equation, a song, or
a work of art-has an origin, a birth, and a life of enduring influence. In each book in
the Basic Ideas series, a leading authority offers a concise biography of a text that
transformed its world, and ours.'
This is the publishing credo at the end of the latest book by Anthony ("Tony")
Lewis.' He is a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner, and former Supreme Court
I Attorney-Advisor, Federal Communications Commission, Office of General Counsel;
Lecturer on First Amendment Problems of the Media, The Catholic University of America,
Columbus School of Law, Institute for Communications Law Studies. B.A., University of
Pennsylvania; M.A., Stanford University; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. Any
views the author expresses in this book review and commentary are his own and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Federal Communications Commission, or any of its
Commissioners or staff. The author also wants to thank for their excellent editorial sugges-
tions Natalie Rastin, Editor-in-Chief, CommLaw Conspectus, Professor Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
Washington College of Law, American University, and Justine S. Lisser, the author's wife
of 25 years to whom he dedicates this book review and commentary.
I ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, End Note (2007).
2 See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE: THE SECOND AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1964); ANTHONY LEWIS, THE SUPREME COURT AND How IT WORKS: THE
STORY OF THE GIDEON CASE (1966); ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE
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reporter and op-ed columnist for The New York Times.' Lewis has also been a
law and journalism professor at Columbia, Harvard, and other universities.' In
his latest book, Lewis's transformative text is the fourteen words in the free
expression clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution:
"Congress shall make no law .. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... -'
Originally enacted in 1791 as the Third Amendment by the 1 st Congress, the
amendment with these fourteen key words became the First Amendment only
after the States failed to ratify the first two proposed amendments.6 Another
surprising fact is that Supreme Court jurisprudence on the First Amendment is
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991) (examining the historic Supreme Court opinion on
defamation, N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which held that the common law
of libel violated the First Amendment when used by public officials against the media and
requiring public officials to demonstrate "actual malice" to recover damages for a defama-
tory falsehood); ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964) (examining the equally his-
toric Supreme Court opinion, Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which held that
an indigent defendant in a state criminal prosecution has the right to have court-appointed
counsel as the Court makes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in all criminal prosecu-
tions obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment). The Court made its Gideon
decision after receiving an unusual handwritten letter from Clarence Earl Gideon, a poor
Florida prisoner. In it, he told the Justices he had been convicted without a lawyer and he
thought that was unfair and unconstitutional. The Supreme Court treated his letter as a peti-
tion for review and granted it. See Anthony Lewis on Free Speech, Gitmo, Nazis, and Ameri-
can Rights, BUZZFLASH INTERVIEW, Jan. 15, 2008,
www.buzzflash.com/articles/interviewes/090 [hereinafter BUZZFLASH INTERVIEW].
3 Lewis won his first Pulitzer Prize in 1955 for reporting on the United States Govern-
ment loyalty program and focusing on the dismissal of Abraham Chasanow, a Navy em-
ployee not informed of the nature of the accusations against him nor of his accusers. Lewis's
articles in the New York Times led to Chasanow's reinstatement. Lewis won his second Pul-
itzer Prize in 1963 for his coverage of the United States Supreme Court. See N.Y. Times,
Anthony Lewis Biography, http://www.nytimes.com/library/opinion/lewis/bio-lewis.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
4 Id.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.") (emphasis added).
6 See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 9. The originally proposed "First Amendment" on the size
of the House of Representatives and congressional apportionment has yet to be ratified by
the States and added to the Constitution. The I st Congress sent the proposed "Second
Amendment" on congressional salaries to the states on September 25, 1789; however, the
amendment was not ratified until May 7, 1992, thereby becoming the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment. Id. ("No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and
Representatives, shall take effect until an election of Representatives shall have intervened."
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII)); see also Fred Barbash, Fundamental Freedoms That
Are Carved in Stone, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2008, at M9 (writing about the opening on April
11, 2008, of the Newseum, the new, interactive museum of the news industry on Pennsyl-
vania Avenue in Washington, D.C. The front comer of the Newseum has engraved on its
marble facade the 45 words of the First Amendment).
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less than eighty years old. It took the Court 140 years after the First Amend-
ment was ratified in 1791 to issue in 1931 its first opinion, Near v. Minnesota,
interpreting the First Amendment in favor of press freedom and against prior
restraint. 7 Moreover, it was not until as late as 1965 in Lamont v. Postmaster
General that the Supreme Court actually found a federal law to be in violation
of the First Amendment
11. THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF JUDGES AND COURTS
A. The "Fear" Factor in Judicial Decision Making on the First Amendment
Why have American courts led by the Supreme Court not always been
champions of the First Amendment? This is a large part of the story Lewis tells
so masterfully in Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the
First Amendment.9 One explanation Lewis highlights is the recurrent "paranoid
style" or "fear" factor in both American politics and law.'" Lewis writes with
specific force about how fear has eaten away at free expression at different,
difficult times in our national history. Lewis tells us that:
The First Amendment is meant to assure Americans that they can believe what they
will and say what they believe. But repeatedly, in times of fear and stress, men and
women have been hunted, humiliated, punished for their words and beliefs. We look
7 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (holding unconstitutional as a prior re-
straint a state statute enjoining publication of allegedly defamatory newspaper regardless of
validity of allegations in publication). Lewis cites Near as the starting point "for the courts
to begin protecting dissenting speakers and publishers from official repression in the United
States" and a "turning point for freedom of the press." LEWIS, supra note 1, at xiii, 44.
8 LEWIS, supra note I, at 125; see also Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301
(1965) (holding unconstitutional as a violation of First Amendment rights statute requiring
U.S. Postal Service to detain and destroy unsealed mail from foreign countries determined
to be "communist political propaganda" unless addressee returned a reply card indicating
desire to receive such mail). Stromberg v. California was the first time the Court held a state
statute unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment. See Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931) (invalidating a California law that forbade the display of a red flag "as
a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government"). Lewis notes that Gitlow
v. New York was the first case in which the Supreme Court "accepted the argument that the
First Amendment's protections of speech and press from federal repression were applied to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. From then on, most of the development of First
Amendment freedoms came in state cases." LEWIS, supra note 1, at 109 (citing Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)).
9 LEWIS, supra note 1.
10 Id. at 21 ("There have been repeated examples of what [the late Columbia University
historian] Richard Hofstadter called 'the paranoid style in American politics."' (quoting
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS, AND OTHER ESSAYS
(1965)). Lewis further notes that repeatedly in American history "the public has been told
that civil liberties must be sacrificed to protect the country from foreign threats." LEWIS,
supra note 1, at 21.
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to the courts to maintain our faithfulness to freedom. This book, like others, tends to
chart the state of American liberty in judicial decisions. But courts have hardly been
consistent guarantors of free speech ... [so that] those who looked to the courts to
stand against the political manipulation of fear were [often] disappointed. "
"Courts did nothing," according to Lewis, "to restrain the harsh conse-
quences of the Sedition Act of 1798,"'" or to stop the first "Red Scare" with its
"Palmer Raids and other government repressions during and after World War
L."' The courts also did nothing to declare unlawful "what was very likely the
greatest blow to constitutional rights in all the wars and times of stress in
American history," namely the forced exclusion and relocation of nearly
100,000 American citizens of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941; 4 or to confront the popu-
lar "passions and fears" of the first seven years of the "second Red Scare" led
by Senator McCarthy, "the maestro of fear and hate," from 1950 until his Sen-
ate censure in 1954 and death in 1957.1
5
I1 Id. at 106, 118.
12 Id. (citing Sedition Act of 1798, one of four laws enacted in 1798 by the Federalists
in Congress, signed into law by President John Adams, and known as the "Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts"). The Sedition Act, with the official title An Act for the Punishment of Certain
Crimes against the United States, made it a crime to publish "false, scandalous, and mali-
cious writing" against the government or its officials. Id. at 11. The law was designed by the
Federalists to punish criticism of President Adams but not of the anti-Federalist Vice Presi-
dent, Thomas Jefferson, in the run up to the hotly contested presidential election of 1800
when Jefferson ultimately beat Adams. Id. at 12. In 1801, once in office, Jefferson "quickly
pardoned" the fourteen journalists and others who had been convicted for violating the Sedi-
tion Act. Id. at 20. The law itself was never reviewed by the courts and expired by its own
terms on March 3, 1801, the day before Jefferson was inaugurated as the third President of
the United States. Id. at 12. Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. cited the Sedition
Act of 1798 "at the heart of his analysis" in the historic libel law decision, N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan. See 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964). The Sedition Act, Brennan wrote, "first crystallized
a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment" and although "never
tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history."
N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 276. "With that, the Sedition Act was found unconstitutional 163
years after it expired." LEWIS, supra note 1, at 53.
13 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 106-07. The Palmer Raids were led by Attorney General A.
Mitchell Palmer, and consisted of more than four thousand arrests and the deportation of
over eight hundred aliens, including the famed radical speaker, Emma Goldman. Id. at 106.
14 Id. at 112-13.
Is Id. at 104, 122-23. Lewis notes:
The public's support for Red-hunting ebbed with the disgrace and death of Senator
McCarthy after he was condemned by the Senate in 1954. In 1957, in Yates v. United
States, the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Harlan read the law as prohibiting
advocacy of violent overthrow [of the government] only when it was accompanied by
an effort at action to that end, not mere abstract advocacy.
Id. at 123 (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)). Lewis also cites a rare in-
stance in the 1950's when the Court "found that a legislative investigation violated the First
Amendment" and that the amendment could protect "a witness accused of Communist asso-
ciations." LEWIS, supra note 1, at 117-18 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957) (reversing on First Amendment grounds a contempt conviction of a college professor
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As in post-September 11 th America, no society is immune from the power
of fear often "manipulated by politicians." 6 This fear, in turn, is often accom-
panied by "excesses of patriotic fervor,"' 7 a patriotism defined in the Bush
Administration, according to one of its most caustic critics, as "flag lapel pins,
the fear of terrorism and the prospect of perpetual war."' 8 So it is unsurprising
that with some exceptions,' 9 neither the Supreme Court, nor any other Federal
courts, have reviewed thoroughly, much less reversed, major aspects of the
Bush Administration's "war on terror." Possibly to facilitate such a future
court review, Lewis details alleged governmental abuses in this seemingly
"endless" war on terrorism, a political tactic used throughout history."
Lewis catalogs the Bush Administration's own assault on due process and
civil liberties, which "broke sharply with American law." 2' The particulars in-
clude: accusing and threatening to prosecute journalists from newspapers such
as The New York Times and Washington Post for allegedly endangering na-
tional security in violation of the Espionage Act by disclosing secret and illegal
wiretapping of American citizens;22 detaining indefinitely American citizens
who refused to answer questions about one of his lectures or his political affiliations)); cf
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (affirming contempt conviction of another
college instructor who refused to answer questions about his beliefs or associations). For a
discussion of Justice Hugo Black's vigorous dissent in Barenblatt, see infra notes 72-75 and
accompanying text.
16 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 103.
17 Interview by Ronald K.L. Collins, First Amendment Scholar, First Amendment Ctr.,
with Anthony Lewis, on C-SPAN After Words (Feb. 11, 2008), available at
http://booktv.org/program.aspx?Programld=9059&SectionName=After/2OWords&PlayMe
dia=No [hereinafter C-SPAN Interview].
18 Frank Rich, Op-Ed., McCain Channels His Inner Hillary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008,
at 12 (Week in Review).
19 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that due process and writ
of habeas corpus require that United States citizen being held as enemy combatant be given
notice of, and meaningful opportunity to contest, factual basis for his detention before a
neutral decision maker as well as access to counsel); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
(holding that federal habeas statute conferred on district court jurisdiction to hear challenges
to the legality of their detentions filed by aliens held as "enemy combatants" at the U.S.
Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding
that military commissions set up without explicit congressional authorization to try detain-
ees at Guantanamo violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice as well as the Geneva
Conventions of 1949); A1-Marri v.Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding the Presi-
dent does not have inherent constitutional authority to order seizure and indefinite military
detention of a civilian).
20 See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 127.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 18-19, 89, 127-28, 150-51; see also Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 791-99
(2000). The original Espionage Act:
made it a crime when the nation was at war for any person: (a) willfully to "make or
convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere" with the military suc-
cess of the United States or "to promote the success of its enemies;" (b) willfully to
"cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the
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citizens suspected of links to terrorism as "enemy combatants" without "trial or
access to counsel;" 3 authorizing "the use of torture and other harsh methods of
interrogation on suspected terrorists detained in a prison in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba and elsewhere in secret CIA prisons;"24 working "to exclude press scru-
tiny-and hence public accountability-by the most sweeping secrecy in
American history;"25 and trying to intimidate war critics who "scare peace-
loving people with phantoms of lost liberty" and thereby "give ammunition to
America's enemies.
'26
military or naval forces of the United States;" or (c) willfully to "obstruct the recruiting
or enlistment service of the United States."
Robert D. Epstein, Comment, Balancing National Security and Free-Speech Rights: Why
Congress Should Revise the Espionage Act, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 483, 485 (2007)
(citing Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery
Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 352 (2003)). This Comment offers an excellent over-
view of the history, "evolving analysis and interpretation" of the Espionage Act. It also ex-
amines in detail the pending Federal case, United States v. Rosen, in which, for the first
time, private citizens have been indicted under other provisions of the Espionage Act, 18
U.S.C. § 793(e) and (g), for receiving and verbally disclosing secret information to a third
party. See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006) "This case has far-
reaching free speech implications for a broad segment of the public, including lobbyists,
academics, journalists, and others who work closely with high-ranking government offi-
cials." Epstein, supra, at 499.
23 LEwIS, supra note 1, at 21, 89, 127, 148.
24 Id. at 127.
25 Id. at 128.
26 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 150 (quoting former Attorney General John Ashcroft). For a
recent, fervent, and thorough call to "end the 'war on terror' as a legal paradigm," see Bruce
Fein, The Presidency: End the war on terror as a legal paradigm, abolish military commis-
sions, and restore FISA, SLATE, Apr. 2, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2187811. Fein is a
former Reagan Administration General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, but
in more recent years, he has been an ardent critic of the alleged legal excesses of the Bush-
Cheney Administration. Fein writes:
International terrorists are criminals, not warriors. The next president should see
to it that terrorists will be captured, interrogated, prosecuted, and punished according to
civilian law. The United States is not at war with international terrorism. The next
president should ensure that we do not brandish the weapons of war in lieu of tradi-
tional law enforcement against international terrorists.
If the conflict of the United States with international terrorism amounts to a war,
then this nation is permanently at war-a condition the Founding Fathers insisted was
irreconcilable with freedom. War crowns the president with monumental powers and
sweeping secrecy. It tends to gratify popular bigotries and encourages a conflation of
any dissent with treason. Remember the imprisonment of Eugene Debs; the concentra-
tion camps for 120,000 Japanese-Americans; the burglary of the office of Lewis Field-
ing, Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist; and President Bush's water-boarding and war-
rantless spying on American citizens in criminal contravention of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978. The next president must recognize the fundamental
dangers of a permanent state of war and the granting of infinite power as commander in
chief.
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Lewis acknowledges that "[m]easures such as indefinite detention and tor-
ture [do] not engage the First Amendment." '"2 Nonetheless, he rightly adds that
they are "reminders that the freedoms of speech and of the press are not the
only tests of a humane and free society."28
B. Courage in Judicial Decision Making on the First Amendment
On the positive side of the balance, however, Lewis also stresses the central
role judges and courts have played in shaping the biography of the First
Amendment, especially in the last eighty years since the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Near v. Minnesota.29 Lewis writes that "[t]he story of the First
Amendment is powerful testimony to the crucial role of judges in a political
system that rests on a foundation of law."3 Lewis even dedicates his book to
Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts-affectionately referred to as "Margie"-his wife. Judges have woven
a "tapestry of rights" out of the fourteen free expression words of the First
Amendment, and without their work, Lewis tells us, the country just "wouldn't
have the First Amendment we have today."3' Our freedoms are "written in the
case law, not in the words of the First Amendment itself."32
Yet, in a famous 1944 speech at a wartime rally in Central Park entitled The
Spirit of Liberty, then District Court and later Second Circuit Judge Learned
Hand said:
'I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon
laws and upon courts. These are false hopes, believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty
lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no
court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While
it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.
3 3
27 LEWIS, supra note I, at 128.
28 Id. Lewis elaborates on the point as follows:
Freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, and physical abuse is just as crucial. The cen-
tral concern among the Framers of the American Constitution was concentrated
power, and the checks and balances they built into our system of government were
intended to prevent that kind of power. The aim of the Bush measures was to give the
president precisely what the Framers had wanted to avoid: unilateral power unchecked
by the other branches of government-and unchecked by the press.
Id.
29 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
30 LEWIS, supra note 1, at xii.
31 C-SPAN Interview, supra note 17.
32 Id.
33 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 107 (quoting Judge Learned Hand). Hand gave his famous
speech in front of over one million people, including 150,000 newly naturalized citizens
who on that same day had pledged their allegiance to their new country. See N. Bruce




To Lewis, although Judge Hand's "rhetoric was memorable," it was a "mis-
leading overstatement."34 Lewis instead argues convincingly that "[m]odem
history shows that courts can do much" to inspire a "devotion to freedom."35
Former Supreme Court Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Louis D.
Brandeis, for example, "had neither sword nor purse .... But they had words,
and their words played a significant part in American society's growing at-
tachment to freedom of speech later in the twentieth century-in the fitful re-
alization of the promise of the First Amendment."36
In his excellent book published in 2004, University of Chicago Law Profes-
sor Geoffrey R. Stone writes: "In the realm of free speech, judges with life
tenure and a more focused attention to the preservation of constitutional liber-
ties are much more likely to protect First Amendment rights than the elected
branches of government."37 Lewis agrees, noting that "the distinctive American
contribution to the philosophy of government has been the role of judges as
protectors of freedom."38
III. "LUMINOUS STATEMENT(S) ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION"
Lewis is a clear, crisp and felicitous writer who appreciates the equally fe-
licitous writing of others. So one of the chief pleasures of reading his latest
book is to have in one source key passages from the First Amendment case
law. These are taken from decisions of such judicial giants as Holmes and
Brandeis, as well as Robert H. Jackson, John Marshall Harlan II, Hugo L.
Black and William J. Brennan, Jr.
These "protectors of freedom" bequeath to us what Lewis aptly describes as
"luminous statement[s] on freedom of expression."39 Lewis writes first of the
brilliant dissents and concurring opinions Holmes and Brandeis wrote between
1919 and 1929. They dissented from the punishment of radical speech, over-
turning "the old, crabbed view of what the First Amendment protects," and
illustrating "the power of words to change minds."4 The Holmes-Brandeis
dissents and concurrences in such landmark cases as Abrams v. United States,4
34 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 107.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION
ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 543-44 (2004).
38 Anthony Lewis, Security and Liberty: Preserving the Values of Freedom, in THE
WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 67 (Richard C. Leone &
Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., 2003).
39 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 132.
40 Id. at 35.
41 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined
by Brandeis, J.).
[Vol. 16
Book Review And Commentary
Whitney v. California,42 and United States v. Schwimmer," "changed the atti-
tude of the country and the Court" to the First Amendment."
A. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Lewis describes Justice Holmes as "the closest we have had to a poet
judge."45 In 1919, Holmes dissented from the Supreme Court majority in
Abrams, which affirmed the convictions of four young radicals under the Es-
pionage Act of 1918.46 Three men were sentenced to twenty years in prison,
and one twenty year-old woman was sentenced to fifteen years for distributing
leaflets opposing President Wilson's sending of troops into Russia after the
Bolshevik Revolution.47 Fifteen or twenty years for criticizing the President of
the United States is unthinkable now; however, in 1919, the Supreme Court
upheld the convictions.48 Holmes that same year had previously authored three
wartime opinions upholding similar convictions under the Espionage Act-
Schenck v. United States,49 Frohwerk v. United States," and Debs v. United
States.' However, in that pivotal year of 1919, Holmes began to evolve in his
thinking about the First Amendment.
According to Lewis, Holmes's thinking began to change after a famous train
ride conversation with Judge Learned Hand on June 19, 1918, between New
York and Boston,52 and especially after reading Freedom of Speech in War
42 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring, joined
by Holmes, J.), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 n.2, 449 (1969) (hold-
ing as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments a state statute punishing "mere
advocacy" without "incitement to imminent lawless action" "likely to incite or produce such
action").
43 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653-55(1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting,
joined by Brandeis, J.).
44 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 35.
45 Id. at 33.
46 Abrams, 250 U.S. 616.
47 Id.
48 Lewis also writes powerfully about how during World War I, seventy-nine citizens of
Montana were convicted under a Montana sedition law and sentenced to lengthy prison
terms at hard labor for criticizing the American war effort, often for just "muttering some-
thing in a tavern" such as the wartime food regulations were "a big joke." LEWIS, supra note
1, at 101; BUZZFLASH INTERVIEW, supra note 2. In May 2006, Montana Governor Brian
Schweitzer posthumously pardoned these Montanans convicted under the 1918 sedition law.
Lewis writes that Schweitzer made a pardon statement that the Governor said should have
been made by his predecessor in 1918: "I'm sorry, forgive me and God bless America, be-
cause we can criticize our government." LEWIS, supra note 1, at 102.
49 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
50 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
51 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
52 See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 30-31. For a more in depth examination of the Hand-
Holmes relationship and its impact on the development of modern First Amendment juris-
20081
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
Time by Harvard Law Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr.53 Focusing on the "his-
torical roots of the First Amendment," the article impressed Holmes with its
historical evidence that the "First Amendment gave broad protection to speech
even in the agitated circumstances of wartime."54
Holmes, however, did not need Chafee's scholarship to draft his dissent in
Abrams. Lewis tells us that "[w]hen he came to write" his opinion he "relied
on his own rhetorical power-which was extraordinary." " And "in words that
forever changed American perceptions of freedom," 6 Holmes told posterity
that:
[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the compe-
tition of the market ....
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment.... While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe
and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate in-
terference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is
57required to save the country....
prudence, see Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN L. REV. 719 (1975). Gunther examines the
effect, for example, of Hand's 1917 decision in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, issued two
years before Holmes wrote his majority opinion in Schenck, and his dissent in Abrams. See
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir.
1917). In this decision, Hand, then a District Court judge, enjoined the government on free
speech grounds from excluding from the mails under the Espionage Act of 1917 an issue of
a monthly radical publication, The Masses. Though soon reversed by the Second Circuit,
Hand's Masses decision was "especially remarkable given the practical and doctrinal cli-
mate of the times, so strikingly inhospitable to dissent." Gunther, supra, at 724; see also
LEWIS, supra note 1, at 30 (discussing the free speech significance of Judge Hand's opinion
in Masses). Long "overshadowed by the clear and present danger criterion [for suppressing
speech] that emerged two years later" in Holmes's opinions in Schenck and Abrams, Hand
advocated a more "'objective' test focusing on the speaker's words: if the language used
was solely that of direct incitement to illegal action, speech could be proscribed; otherwise,
it was protected." Gunther, supra, at 72 1. Lewis writes of a similar test to deal with current
terrorist incitement to violence. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 166-67; see also infra Part V.C.
53 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932
(1919). Chafee (1885-1957) was an early scholar of free speech, author of numerous books
and articles, Harvard Law School professor for 40 years, and active civil libertarian. Senator
Joseph McCarthy once described Chafee as "dangerous" to the United States. See John
Wertheimer, Review: Freedom of Speech: Zechariah Chafee and Free-Speech History, 22
REVIEWS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 365 (1994).
54 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 31. Chafee wrote that the Framers of the First Amendment
like James Madison intended "to wipe out the common law of sedition and make further
prosecutions for criticisms of the government, without any incitement to law-breaking, for-
ever impossible in the United States." Id. (quoting Chafee, supra note 53).
55 Id. at 32.
56 Id.
57 Id. (quoting Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by Brandeis, J.).
Lewis points out as an interesting aside that "the phrase 'marketplace of ideas' is often used
as if it were Holmes's, but he did not exactly say that. Professor Vincent Blasi traced the
[Vol. 16
Book Review And Commentary
B. Justice Louis D. Brandeis
Lewis notes that many regard Brandeis's strong concurrence in Whitney v
California, in which Holmes joined, as "the greatest judicial statement of the
case for freedom of speech.""0 As Brandeis wrote:
Those who won our independence ... believed liberty to be the secret of happiness
and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that
with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemina-
tion of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that
public discussion is a political duty . . . that fear breeds repression; that repression
breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the
fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.59
Brandeis went on to declare in equally stirring words that:
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear
political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty .... If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the proc-
esses of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be
reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the command of the Constitution. It
is therefore always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and
assembly by showing that there was no emergency justifying it.
60
phrase and found its first use in a letter to the editor of the New York Times from David M.
Newbold in 1936." LEWIS, supra note 1, at 185.
58 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 35 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80
(1927)). One of the additional pleasures lovers of history will get from reading Lewis's
book are his frequent journalistic descriptions of the fates of the subjects of these historic
First Amendment cases. He tells us, for example, of "Anita Whitney, a member of a socially
prominent family who helped to found the Communist Labor Party of California," sen-
tenced for her radicalism under California's "criminal syndicalism" statute to one to four-
teen years in the San Quentin penitentiary, but then "a month after the Supreme Court
turned down her appeal," being pardoned by the governor of California who quoted at
length in his pardon message Brandeis's concurrence. Id. at 35-36. In contrast, Lewis tells
us:
The fate of the four radicals who lost in the Abrams case was different. They were re-
leased from prison in 1921 on condition that they go to the Soviet Union. Mollie
Steiner and Jacob Abrams were unhappy with the tyranny they encountered under Len-
inism and left for Mexico. Hyman Lachowsky and Samuel Lipman stayed in the
USSR-and died at the hands, respectively, of Soviet and Nazi terror.
Id. at 37.
59 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring, joined by Holmes, J.) (emphasis
added).
60 Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
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C. Justice Holmes Revisited
Finally, Lewis places the Supreme Court's rediscovery of the First Amend-
ment in Holmes's eloquent dissent in United States v. Schwimmer. Holmes
wrote this decision when he was already eighty-eight years old. 6' His words
gave Lewis the title of his book:
Some of [Schwimmer's pacifist opinions] might excite popular passion, but if there is
any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any
other it is the principle offree thought-not free thought for those who agree with us
but freedom for the thought that we hate. I think that we should adhere to that princi-
ple with regard to admission into, as well as to life within this country. And recurring
to the opinion that bars this applicant's way, I would suggest that the Quakers have
done their share to make the country what it is, that many citizens agree with the ap-
plicant's belief and that I had not supposed hitherto that we regretted our inability to
expel them because they believed more than some of us do in the teachings of the
Sermon on the Mount. 62
61 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). Lewis adds another fascinating
"personal note" describing when he first read Justice Holmes's opinion in Schwimmer:
Some time around 1960, when I was reporting on the Supreme Court for the New York
Times, I was talking with Justice Felix Frankfurter in his chambers. Suddenly, to make
a point, he rose and strode across the room to his shelves of United States Reports, the
volumes of Supreme Court opinions. He pulled one off the shelf, opened it, handed it to
me. ["As he did so, he said, "You talk about liberals and liberalism. Here, read this!"
C-SPAN Interview, supra note 17] It was the Holmes dissent in United States v.
Schwimmer. I read. When I came to the final paragraph, ending ... Sermon on the
Mount," I felt the hair rise on the back of my neck.
LEWIS, supra note 1, at 38.
62 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 37-38 (quoting Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 654-55 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting, joined by Brandeis, J.)) (emphasis added). Adding yet another humanizing note,
Lewis tells us that Rosika Schwimmer was an immigrant from Hungary who applied for
U.S. citizenship but because of her pacifist beliefs refused to swear that she would take up
arms to defend the United States, a requirement at that time to become a U.S. citizen. As a
result, she was denied the right to become a citizen and the Supreme Court upheld the de-
nial. Id. at 37. Lewis also tells us that Holmes did not agree with the pacifism of Rosika
Schwimmer. He was a Civil War veteran whose Union uniform was still hanging in his
closet at his death in 1935, seventy years after the end of the Civil War in 1865. Id. at 34,
37. In fact, Holmes was wounded three times during the Civil War and attached a note to the
uniform stating that the stains were his own blood. The Supreme Court, Justice Profiles,
http://www.thirteen.org/pressroom/pdf/supremecourtlSupremeCourtJustices.pdf (last visited
Apr. 15, 2008). Nonetheless, in his dissent, Holmes pointed out to the Court that Schwim-
mer's "refusal to swear was irrelevant, 'as she is a woman over fifty years of age, and would
not be allowed to bear arms if she wanted to."' LEWIS, supra note 1, at 37 (quoting
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 653-54). Holmes then added his immortal words about the consti-
tutional necessity of defending Schwimmer's freedom of thought, not merely "free thought
for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate." Id.
[Vol. 16
Book Review And Commentary
D. Justice Robert H. Jackson
Later "luminous" jurists and elegant wordsmiths that Lewis quotes with ob-
vious delight include former Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson. Also a
Solicitor General and Attorney General, Jackson was a close confidante of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, who once considered Jackson his possible successor as
President.6" Jackson was also United States Chief Prosecutor at the Nazi War
Crimes tribunal at Nuremberg.' Of particular relevance here, Jackson is widely
considered one of the finest writers in the history of the Supreme Court.65
Writing for a 6-3 majority in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,
Jackson held that state compulsion of the flag salute violated the First
Amendment:
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating
dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the
graveyard.
It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to our Constitution was
designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings ....
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If
there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to US.
66
63 See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROo-
SEVELT, at xvi (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003).
64 Jackson's four-hour opening address to the war crimes tribunal in Nuremberg was
widely praised as "magnificent" and "one of the finest examples of advocacy" in modem
times. Id. at viii.
65 See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH I! 178 (5th ed. 2008)
("[l]f there were no other justification for holding Jackson in high esteem as a jurist, his
magnificent prose-second in beauty and clarity perhaps only to that of Cardozo-has
earned him the nation's high regard and gratitude. Who could ever forget the haunting
beauty of his phrases?").
66 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943). Jackson also dissented
eloquently from the Supreme Court's decision in Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States,
which upheld the post-Pearl Harbor military order excluding and removing from the West
Coast of the United States all persons of Japanese ancestry, including nearly 100,000
American citizens. Jackson declared that:
A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military
emergency .... But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it
conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the
Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle
of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens.
The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority
that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.
Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944), rh 'g denied, 324 U.S.
885 (1945) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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E. Justice John Marshall Harlan II
Lewis also cites Cohen v. California, another "luminous statement on free-
dom of expression." The opinion was written by a more conservative Justice,
John Marshall Harlan II, not remembered normally for his First Amendment
jurisprudence.67
A young man opposing the draft during the Vietnam War was convicted of
"engaging in tumultuous conduct" by walking through a Los Angeles court-
house corridor wearing a jacket on which were inscribed the words "Fuck the
Draft."6 Writing for a 5-4 majority, Harlan wrote that "one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric," and that in the context of opposing the Vietnam War, the "un-
seemly expletive" was used as a political protest.69 Harlan explained his rea-
soning as follows:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse
and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints
from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us.. ..
Citing Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney, Harlan went on to note:
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to be only
verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, however, within es-
tablished limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which
the process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled
with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength.7'
F. Justice Hugo L. Black
One of the final Supreme Court Justices Lewis praises for his First Amend-
ment jurisprudence is Hugo L. Black. In 1959, Black dissented from a 5-4 ma-
jority in Barenblatt v. United States.7 ' The majority rejected the First Amend-
ment claim of a Vassar College psychology professor convicted for refusing to
answer questions on his beliefs and associations from a subcommittee of the
then "House Committee on Un-American Activities" investigating alleged
"Communist infiltration" of higher education.73 In a strong dissent, Black
wrote that he could not
67 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Interestingly, Justice Hugo L. Black, usually
a First Amendment "absolutist" or "literalist," dissented in this case. See infra note 129.
Black also voted with the majority in Korematsu to uphold the relocation of Japanese-
Americans from the West Coast in World War II. See supra note 66.
68 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 31 (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. 15).
69 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
70 Id. at 24.
71 Id. at 25.
72 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), rh'g denied, 361 U.S. 854 (1959).
73 Id.
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agree with the Court's notion that First Amendment freedoms must be abridged in or-
der to 'preserve' our country.... The First Amendment means to me, however, that
the only constitutional way our Government can preserve itself is to leave its people
the fullest possible freedom to praise, criticize or discuss, as they see fit, all govern-
mental policies and to suggest, if they desire, that even its most fundamental postu-
lates are bad and should be changed .... On that premise this land was created, and
on that premise it has grown to greatness.
Ultimately, Black concluded that "all the questions in this case really boil
down to one-whether we as a people will try fearfully and futilely to preserve
democracy by adopting totalitarian methods, or whether in accordance with our
traditions and our Constitution we will have the confidence and [the] courage
to be free."T
In New York Times v. United States, a 6-3 majority held in June 1971 that
the Times, the Washington Post, and other newspapers could resume their en-
joined publication of top-secret documents from an official history of the Viet-
nam War known as the "Pentagon Papers."76 Out of "10 different opinions of-
fering diverse arguments," according to Lewis, Justice Black wrote "the most
powerful, and no doubt the most lasting, 7 7 with strong resonance down to to-
day's unpopular war in Iraq. In his last opinion before his death in the summer
of 1971, Black wrote that:
The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the
people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in gov-
ernment. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to pre-
vent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to
distant lands to die offoreign fevers and foreign shot and shell. In my view, far from
deserving condemnation for their courageous reporting, The New York Times, the
Washington Post, and other newspapers should be commended for serving the pur-
pose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the workings of govern-
ment that led to the Vietnam War, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the
Founders hoped and trusted they would do. 8
G. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
The most recent First Amendment decisions Lewis quotes in his book are
two cases on flag burning and desecration from 1989 and 1990 both written by
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. In Texas v. Johnson, a 5-4 decision, the Su-
preme Court reversed on First Amendment grounds a conviction for burning
the American flag in a political demonstration.79 Not without a vigorous dissent
from Justice Stevens, as well as one from Justice Rehnquist, in which Justices
74 Id. at 145-46 (Black, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
76 N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
77 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 47.
78 N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 717 (emphasis added).
79 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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tices White and O'Connor joined, and a "personal" concurring opinion from
Justice Kennedy,8" the Johnson decision interpreted the First Amendment to
protect the "expressive conduct" of burning the flag as "symbolic speech."'"
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan declared:
If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the govern-
ment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable. We have not recognized an exception to this principle
even where our flag has been involved.... In short, nothing in our precedents sug-
gests that a State may foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive con-
duct relating to it.
8 2
Then in 1990, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Eichman, by the same
5-4 majority, held the Flag Protection Act of 1989 unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds.83 Enacted by Congress as a response to the Johnson de-
cision, the law punished anyone "who, except to dispose of a worn or soiled
flag, 'mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, bums, maintains on the floor or
ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States."' 8 4 Again writing for
the majority, Justice Brennan noted that each of the terms of the statute "un-
mistakably connote[d] disrespectful treatment of the flag" and suggested "a
focus on those acts likely to damage the flag's symbolic value."85 Therefore,
the Federal law suffered "from the same fundamental flaw" as the Texas stat-
ute the Court invalidated in Johnson: it suppressed "expression out of concern
for its likely communicative impact."86
80 In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote:
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them
because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see
them, compel the result. And so great is our commitment to the process that, except in
the rare case, we do not pause to express distaste for the result, perhaps for fear of un-
dermining a valued principle that dictates the decision. This is one of those rare cases.
Id. at 420-21 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, to the surprise of some observers,
also voted with his more liberal colleagues, Justices Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and
Harry Blackmun, to overturn the flag desecration convictions. See Johnson, 491 U.S. 397;
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
81 Johnson, 491 U.S. 310; see also LEWIS, supra note 1, at 40, 165.
82 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414-15 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (citing thirteen
Supreme Court precedents for support); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 488 U.S. 726, 745
(1978) ("[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for sup-
pressing it. If it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for
according it constitutional protection."); cf infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the current litigation over the FCC's policy to enforce its broadcast indecency regu-
lation against the use of "fleeting expletives" "in any context").
83 Eichman, 496 U.S. 310.
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Brennan acknowledged that "desecration of the flag is deeply offensive to
many.""7 But he added that "the same might be said ... of virulent ethnic and
religious epithets . . . , vulgar repudiations of the draft. . . , and scurrilous cari-
catures," all of which the Court had tolerated and upheld on First Amendment
grounds in previous decisions."8 Repeating the same "bedrock principle under-
lying the First Amendment" he enunciated in Johnson,89 Brennan concluded
his Eichman opinion by noting, "[p]unishing desecration of the flag dilutes the
very freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering."90
IV. THE ROBERTS COURT: NOT YET "SOUNDING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT BUGLE" 91
Lewis has nothing to say about the First Amendment decisions of the Court
since John Roberts began his tenure as Chief Justice in October 2005. This is
not surprising as the Roberts Court is just beginning to make its mark on First
Amendment jurisprudence.9 2 Nonetheless, it is a mark about which Lewis
might well raise some questions.
A. Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life: The First
Amendment "Tie Goes to the Speaker"
On June 25, 2007, at the end of his second term, Chief Justice Roberts re-
ceived extensive media attention for his majority opinion in Federal Election
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life.93 This 5-4 decision held violative of
the First Amendment the provision in the campaign finance law known as the
"McCain-Feingold Act" prohibiting the use of a candidate's name in a televi-
87 Id. at318.
88 Id. at 318-19 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)).
89 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
90 Eichman,496 U.S. at 319.
91 The phrase comes from Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion in Morse v. Freder-
ick. 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007) ("Stripped of rhetorical flourishes ... the debate between
the dissent and this opinion is less about constitutional first principles than about whether
Frederick's banner constitutes promotion of illegal drug use. We have explained our view
that it does. The dissent's contrary view on that relatively narrow question hardly justifies
sounding the First Amendment bugle."); see infra Part IV.B for further discussion of Morse.
92 For access to citations and summaries of other free expression cases in the Roberts
Supreme Court dockets since he assumed the position of Chief Justice in October 2005, see
First Amendment Center, First Amendment Library,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/faclibrary/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
93 Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
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sion campaign advertisement, or "electioneering communication," thirty days
before a primary election or sixty days before a general election.94
This prohibition on electioneering communications was a key provision of
the McCain-Feingold Act that aimed to limit the impact of special interest
money on political campaigns. The Roberts decision vindicated Wisconsin
Right to Life's strategy to run a television advertisement just before the 2006
Wisconsin Senate primary that attacked Wisconsin Senator Russell Feingold's
support of a Democratic filibuster against President Bush's most conservative
judicial nominees. Roberts wrote that the statutory prohibition at issue was an
unconstitutional infringement on the rights of corporations, labor unions, and
special interest groups like Wisconsin Right to Life to engage in issue advo-
cacy. "Discussion of issues," Roberts wrote, "cannot be suppressed simply
because the issues may also be pertinent in an election."95 He then added his
widely-quoted line: "Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to
the speaker, not the censor. 96
Despite Roberts's rhetoric, critics quickly condemned his decision as a "big
win for big money" that would only "encourage a financial arms race between
well-heeled special interest groups" and "reopen[] the door to corruption.""
Others suggested that Roberts "only ... embraced the First Amendment" in
Wisconsin Right to Life to "protect[] corporate free-speech interests."98 One
observer described the decision even more caustically, stating that "the impli-
cation that [the Roberts] court defends First Amendment rights is pretty much
hogwash.... the court is really saying that the tie goes to speakers who have
money and power. That is, if the speaker is rich and influential, then free
speech wins. If not, free speech loses."99
This cynical viewpoint may have been reinforced by the fact that Roberts's
glowing language about the First Amendment appeared "in the only case of the
[2006-07] term in which the First Amendment claimant was the clear winner
94 See id.; see also Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002 § 203,
2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A), 441b(b)(2) (2000)).
95 Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2669.
96 Id.
97 Robert Barnes, 5-4 Supreme Court Weakens Curbs on Pre-Election TV Ads, WASH.
POST, June 26, 2007, at Al.
98 Tony Mauro, Rhetoric Aside, Most First Amendment Claimants Lose, FIRST AMEND-
MENT CTR., July 16, 2007, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id= 18804.
99 See Garrett Epps, Free Speech for the Rich and Powerful, SALON.COM,
www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2007/06/29/supremecourt/. Epps is a Professor of Law at
University of Oregon School of Law. In contrast, Richard W. Garnett, an Associate Profes-
sor of Law at University of Notre Dame School of Law, has noted that "[t]his criticism is
not well founded" since non-corporate groups like the American Civil Liberties Union and
the AFL-CIO "urged the position that Roberts and the Court majority took" in Wisconsin
Right to Life. Mauro, supra note 98.
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over a government adversary."'' ° As one journalist described, "[i]t was that
kind of term for the First Amendment: soaring rhetoric on one hand, less-than-
positive results on the other.""' Indeed, Roberts read his "speaker" over "cen-
sor" words from the bench just moments after he read from another First
Amendment decision in which "the censor was the clear winner over the
speaker." 2
B. Morse v. Frederick: School "Censor" Wins Over Student "Speaker"
Morse v. Frederick was a 6-3 opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts was
joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito-the same conservative
majority in Wisconsin Right to Life-as well as by Justice Breyer concurring in
the judgment but dissenting as to the decision's rationale.' 3 From a student's
perspective, this decision is undoubtedly the Roberts Court's most prominent
First Amendment opinion to date. "0 The Court held that a high school principal
did not violate a student's right to free speech when she confiscated the stu-
dent's banner declaring "BONG Hits 4 JESUS" at an off-campus, school-
approved activity and suspended the student for ten days.0 5 Reversing the
Ninth Circuit, which had overturned a District Court grant of summary judg-
ment for the school district, Chief Justice Roberts noted that schools may take
steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can "reasona-
bly be viewed as promoting illegal drug use" in violation of school policy.
Thus, the school officials did not violate the First Amendment by confiscating
the pro-drug banner and suspending the student.' 6 Roberts further noted that
100 Mauro, supra note 98.
101 Id.
102 Id. Mauro notes that First Amendment claims were also denied in several other cases
during Roberts's second term. Id. (citing Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood
Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007) (involving speech rights of private school coaches); Daven-
port v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007) (involving public-sector unions' spend-
ing of nonmembers' fees for election-related purposes); Hein v. Freedom From Religion
Found., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (holding that taxpayers did not have standing to challenge
President Bush's "faith-based initiative" as an Establishment Clause violation)).
103 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). In his concurrence, Justice Breyer wrote
that the Court "should not decide this difficult First Amendment issue on the merits," but
"should simply hold that qualified immunity bars the student's claim for monetary damages
and say no more." Id. at 2638 (Breyer, J., concurring).
104 See, e.g., Joanna Naim, Recent Development, Free Speech 4 Students? Morse v. Fre-
derick and the Incultation of Values in Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 239 (2008);
Kellie Nelson, Note, Constitutional Law-The Supreme Court Takes a Fractured Stance on
What Students Can Say About Drugs: Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), 8 WYO.
L. REV. 291 (2008); Justin Lee Bell, Comment, Morse v. Frederick: A Dubious Decision
Shows a Need for Judicial Restraint by the Supreme Court, 53 S.D. L. REV. 100 (2008).




"the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically co-
extensive with the rights of adults in other settings"'0 7 and the First Amend-
ment must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the school envi-
ronment."'0 8 Ultimately, Roberts concluded that the Court's decision to restrict
student free speech rights under these circumstances "hardly justifies sounding
the First Amendment bugle."'0 9
Yet, sound it the three dissenters did. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Souter and Ginsburg, did not dispute the points Chief Justice Roberts argued,
but noted that:
[T]he First Amendment protects student speech if the message itself neither violates a
permissible rule nor expressly advocates conduct that is illegal and harmful to stu-
dents. This nonsense banner [did] neither, and the Court [did] serious violence to the
First Amendment in upholding-indeed, lauding-a school's decision to punish [the
student] for expressing a view with which it disagreed." 0
Citing Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney and Holmes's dissent in Abrams,
Justice Stevens concluded that:
Even in high school, a rule that permits only one point of view to be expressed is less
likely to produce correct answers than the open discussion of countervailing views. In
the national debate about a serious issue, it is the expression of the minority's view-
point that most demands the protection of the First Amendment. Whatever the better
policy may be, a full and frank discussion of the costs and benefits of the attempt to
prohibit the use of marijuana is far wiser than suppression of speech because it is un-
popular. "'
Despite Stevens's rhetorical flourishes A la Brandeis and Holmes, Morse
may have limited First Amendment significance. Asked to comment on the
case during an interview about his book, Lewis responded that "this is a mar-
ginal case and is not very telling" as to the future of the First Amendment in
the Supreme Court." 2
107 Id. at 2621 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)).
108 Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
109 Id. at 2629.
10 Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 2651 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring, joined by Holmes, J.); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by Brandeis, J.)).
112 C-SPAN Interview, supra note 17. Similarly, another observer noted that the interest-
ing aspect of Morse is the "divisions among the conservatives" rather than the holding of the
case itself. Mauro, supra, note 98 (quoting Notre Dame Law School Professor Richard Gar-
nett). For example, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kennedy, "wrote a separate concurrence
to underscore that the Court was making a narrow decision that cannot be used to justify
broader restriction of student speech on political or social issues." Id. Alito agreed with the
majority that "public schools may ban speech advocating illegal drug use" but he regarded
such regulation "as standing at the far reaches of what the First Amendment permits." Id.
(quoting Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring)). In contrast, Justice Thomas took
a "more extreme position," and wrote in his concurrence that Tinker should be overturned
altogether. Id. Cited by Chief Justice Roberts in his majority opinion, Tinker is the 1969
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C. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC: "Arbitrary and F^@#$*!
Capricious?"'' 3
A case that may be more "telling" as to the future direction the Roberts
Court will take on the First Amendment will be briefed by the parties, heard
and decided by the Court in its 2008-2009 term. On March 17, 2008, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in the first broadcast indecency" 4 case it has
accepted in over thirty years since the Court's landmark 1978 decision in FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation upholding the Federal Communications Commission's
("FCC") broadcast indecency regulations." "
The Roberts Court will review the Second Circuit's decision in Fox Televi-
sion Stations, Inc. v. FCC."6 In a 2-1 decision, a three-judge panel held that the
FCC's policy to sanction broadcast licensees for the use of "fleeting exple-
tives" like "fuck" and "shit" was arbitrary and capricious under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act because it was a "dramatic change in agency policy
Court decision upholding student rights to political protest in school, provided it does not
disrupt school discipline. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. The significance of Alito's decision to
"make a strong statement limiting the scope of the Court's decision" in Morse is that it is
reminiscent of his tenure on the Third Circuit. Mauro, supra note 98. In 2001, for example,
"Alito wrote a decision striking down a student speech code on First Amendment grounds."
Id. (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001)).
"13 Justin Winquist, Arbitrary and F"@#$*! Capricious: An Analysis of the Second Cir-
cuit 's Rejection of the FCC's Fleeting Expletive Regulation in Fox Television Stations, Inc.
v. FCC (2007), 57 AM. U. L. REV. 723 (2008).
114 See FCC CONSUMER FACTS: OBSCENE, INDECENT, AND PROFANE BROADCASTS (2007),
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/obscene.pdf ("The FCC has defined broadcast inde-
cency as 'language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offen-
sive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual
or excretory organs or activities."').
115 See Fox Television Stations, Inc., 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76
U.S.L.W. 3490 (U.S. Mar. 17, 2008) (No. 07-582); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978). The legal literature on broadcast indecency regulation is voluminous and will no
doubt expand in the period leading up to and following the Court's decision in Fox. For
contrasting viewpoints on the constitutionality of the FCC's broadcast indecency policy and
enforcement regime in the context of the pending litigation, compare Winquist, supra note
113, at 723 ("[T]he inclusion of fleeting expletives is constitutional under current law, fal-
ling squarely within the Supreme Court's approval of context-based broadcast speech re-
strictions."), with Robert Corn-Revere, Ronald G. London & Amber Husbands, Second
Circuit Rejects FCC's "Fleeting Expletives "' Policy; Questions Indecency Regime (June
2007), http://www.dwt.com/practc/communications/bulletins/06-07_Indecency.htm (arguing
that the Second Circuit decision "called into serious question the ongoing constitutionality
of the FCC's [indecency] enforcement regime as presently formulated" and noting that in
multiple pages of dicta the court "question[ed] whether the FCC's indecency test-'patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards' coupled with an 'artistic
necessity' exception-can survive First Amendment scrutiny"); see also infra note 122 for
further discussion of the First Amendment issues in Fox v. FCC.
116 Fox, 489 F.3d 444.
20081
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
without adequate explanation." ' The change the majority referred to was the
FCC's shift from evaluating the "full context" of the alleged indecency rather
than just the "isolated or fleeting" use of an expletive before sanctioning a li-
censee, to a policy of sanctioning the per se use of such expletives "in any con-
text" regardless of how "isolated or fleeting."" 8
Bound by the Court's Pacifica precedent upholding the FCC's broadcast in-
decency policy, the Second Circuit also exercised its judicial self-restraint un-
der the canon of "constitutional avoidance," and refrained from ruling on the
constitutionality of the FCC's indecency policy and enforcement regime under
117 Id. at 454. The lone dissenting judge concluded that the FCC "gave a reasoned expla-
nation for its change of standard and thus complied with the requirement of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act." Id. at 467 (Leval, J., dissenting).
18 Compare In re Industry Guidance on the Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, Policy Statement,
16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 9, 17-18 (Mar. 14, 2001) (specifying that "[i]n determining whether
material is patently offensive, the full context in which the material appeared is critically
important" and citing examples of material found from the context not to be not indecent
because they were "isolated or fleeting" in nature) (emphasis in original) with In re Com-
plaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the "Golden Globe
Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 8 (Mar. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter 2004 Order] (concluding that any use of the "F-Word" has an inherent sexual
connotation "in any context" and thus falls within the first prong of the FCC's indecency
definition). The 2004 Order explicitly rejected "prior Commission and staff action" indicat-
ing "that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the 'F-Word' such as that here are not indecent or
would not be acted upon," and concluded that "any such interpretation is no longer good
law." Id. 12; see, e.g., In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding
Their Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18
F.C.C.R. 19,859, 5-7 (Oct. 3, 2003) (deciding that when the rock singer Bono said that it
was "really, really, fucking brilliant" upon accepting an award during a live broadcast of the
Golden Globe Awards on the Fox Television Network, he was not using the "F-Word" to
describe "sexual or excretory organs or activities," but as a language "intensifier," "an ad-
jective or expletive to emphasize an exclamation," and thus "the various licensees that aired
the 'Golden Globe Awards' program ... did not violate the law, and ... no action is war-
ranted"). The 2004 Order further stated that "the mere fact that specific words or phrases are
not sustained or repeated does not mandate a finding that material that is otherwise patently
offensive to the broadcast medium is not indecent." 2004 Order, supra, 12. The 2004 Or-
der, which Fox and other TV networks are challenging in Fox v. FCC, ultimately found that
the Golden Globe broadcast of Bono's remark was indecent under the broadcast indecency
statute, 18 U.S.C.§ 1464. However, the Order did not impose a forfeiture on the broadcast
licensees because it was reversing Commission precedent regarding the broadcast of the "F-
Word." Id. 17. For an extensive discussion and analysis of the "evolution of the FCC's
indecency regulations," and the Golden Globe Awards decision, see ANGIE A. WELBORN &
HENRY COHEN, REGULATION OF BROADCAST INDECENCY: BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ANALY-
sis (2005). This Congressional Research Service Report also details the infamous "wardrobe
malfunction," and subsequent FCC decision to impose a $550,000 forfeiture on several Via-
com-owned CBS affiliates for the broadcast of the Super Bowl XXXVIII halftime show on
February 1, 2004, in which performer Justin Timberlake exposed for a brief moment the
breast of his co-performer, Janet Jackson. See CBS Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, No. 06-3575
(3d Cir. argued Sept. 11, 2007).
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the First Amendment. "' However, the court strongly noted in several pages of
dicta its skepticism "that the Commission can provide a reasoned explanation
for its 'fleeting expletive' regime that can pass constitutional muster.""'2 The
"potential [constitutional] problems" with the FCC's indecency policy, the
court noted, are that "the FCC's indecency regime is unconstitutionally vague;
the FCC's indecency test permits the Commission to make subjective determi-
nations about the quality of speech in violation of the First Amendment; and
the FCC's indecency regime is an impermissible content-based regulation of
speech that violates the First Amendment."''
119 Fox, 489. F.3d at 462. The canon of "constitutional avoidance" is a rule of statutory
interpretation providing:
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn into question, and even if a seri-
ous doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
120 Fox, 489 F.3d at 462. For the court's dicta on its skepticism that the FCC's "'fleeting
expletive' regime" can "pass constitutional muster," see id. at 462-66.
121 Id. at 454 (numbers omitted). For example, the court noted that it was
sympathetic to the Networks' contention that the FCC's indecency test is undefined,
indiscernible, inconsistent, and consequently, unconstitutionally vague. Although the
Commission has declared that all variants of"fuck" and "shit" are presumptively inde-
cent and profane, repeated use of those words in "Saving Private Ryan," for example,
was neither indecent nor profane. And while multiple occurrences of expletives in
"Saving Private Ryan" was not gratuitous, a single occurrence of "fucking" in the
Golden Globe Awards [for which Fox was cited] was "shocking and gratuitous."
Id. at 463 (citations omitted). The court further noted the FCC's "inconsistency" in finding
numerous expletives as "integral" to a fictional movie about war, but "indecent" and "pro-
fane" when spoken by real musicians in Martin Scorsese's PBS documentary The
Blues:Godfathers and Sons because "the educational purpose of the documentary 'could
have been fulfilled and all viewpoints expressed without the repeated broadcast of exple-
tives."' Id. (citations omitted). Martin Scorsese, protesting the FCC's indecency ruling on
his documentary, told the FCC that
profanity was integral to the language of his TV documentary and that to censor it
would "strip the documentary of its essential authenticity and historical accuracy....
The language of blues musicians often was filled with expletives that shocked and
challenged America's white dominated society of the forties, fifties and sixties .... To
accurately capture the essential character of the blues music and the subculture in
which it originated and flourished, it was important to preserve in the film the actual
speech and discursive formations of the participants." To do otherwise would be
'whitewashing the blues.'
See John Eggerton, FCC 'Whitewashing' Blues, Says Scorsese, BROAD. & CABLE, May 8,
2006, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6332444.html. This is almost identical
to the rationale the Commission itself used when explaining why it was not sanctioning the
use of the same "indecent," "profane" words in Saving Private Ryan: because editing them
out "would have altered the nature of the artistic work and diminished the power, realism
and immediacy of the film experience for viewers." See In re Complaints Regarding Vari-
ous Television Broadcasts Between February 2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, Notices of Appar-
ent Liability and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 82 (Feb. 21, 2006)
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If Tony Lewis had his way, the Supreme Court would ultimately find the
FCC's entanglement in indecency enforcement unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds.'22 Lewis believes the FCC is too "dogged" in its role as
(citing In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Regarding Their Broadcast
on November 11, 2004, of the ABC Television Network's Presentation of the film "Saving
Private Ryan," Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4507, 13-14 (Feb. 3,
2005)). For further critique of this alleged FCC inconsistency and intrusion into artistic de-
cision making and their implications for the First Amendment, see Stephen A. Weiswasser
& Robert M. Sherman, Oprah and Spielberg vs. Without a Trace and Scorsese: Indecent
Inconsistency at the FCC, COMM. LAW., Spring 2006, at 3-8 ("The Commission's detour
into the world of 'artistic necessity' is the only apparent objective distinction between God-
fathers and Private Ryan, and it is perhaps without precedent in the history of governmental
regulation of protected speech. The upshot is that a documentary attempting to give the
audience a feel for the actual figures who shaped a national musical movement should not
have shown them as they are or captured how they speak, but a fictionalized portrayal of an
event could use the same language to portray characters who are totally imaginary. As oth-
ers have observed, the lesson apparently to be drawn from a comparison of the two cases is
that reality is permissible when fictionalized but prohibited when real people and actual
people are involved.").
122 Robert Corn-Revere is a leading First Amendment attorney in private practice, former
Legal Adviser to former FCC Commissioner James Quello, former lecturer in the Institute
for Communications Law Studies, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School
of Law, and long-time opponent of the FCC's indecency regime. He and two of his col-
leagues summarized the Second Circuit's constitutional dicta argument as follows:
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU that invalidated as unconstitu-
tionally vague a legal standard nearly identical to the FCC's formulation of its inde-
cency rule, the court said: "we are hard pressed to imagine a regime that is more vague
than one that relies entirely on consideration of the otherwise unspecified 'context' of a
broadcast indecency." The court also stated that "the FCC's indecency test" also raises
"the separate constitutional question of whether it permits the FCC to sanction speech
based on [the agency's] subjective view of the merit of that speech." It added, "the
FCC's current indecency regime" of requiring that "the broadcaster.., demonstrate to
the satisfaction of the Commission, under an unidentified burden of proof, that the ex-
pletives were 'integral' to the work . . . gives too much discretion to government offi-
cials" in violation of the First Amendment.
The court noted that "all speech covered by the FCC's indecency policy is fully pro-
tected by the First Amendment." Although the court stopped short of saying that
broadcast media should be subject to strict First Amendment scrutiny, it observed that
it is getting extremely difficult to describe the broadcast media as "uniquely perva-
sive," as it was when the Supreme Court first allowed more onerous restrictions on
broadcast "speech." Accordingly, it cited the United States v. Playboy decision for the
proposition that strict scrutiny may soon apply to broadcasting. The court cited the
availability of less restrictive means of avoiding the perceived harm through, for in-
stance, the use of the V-Chip. It concluded: "The FCC is free to regulate indecency, but
its regulatory powers are bounded by the Constitution. If the Playboy decision is any
guide, technological advances may obviate the constitutional legitimacy of the FCC's
robust oversight."
Robert Corn-Revere, Ronald G. London & Amber Husbands, Second Circuit Rejects FCC's
"Fleeting Expletives" Policy; Questions Indecency Regime (June 2007),
http://www.dwt.com/practc/communications/bulletins/06-07_Indecency.htm. Corn-Revere
and his colleagues further noted that:
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national "nanny."' 23 In his February 2008 C-SPAN interview, Lewis critiqued
the FCC's indecency enforcement regime as a "fantastic waste of time" and
"politically ridiculous."'' 4 Commenting on the FCC's decision to fine forty-
four stations affiliated with, or owned-and-operated by, the ABC Television
Network $27,500 each for briefly airing a "bare buttocks" during an otherwise
artistically serious episode of the critically acclaimed television police drama,
NYPD Blue, Lewis asked why the FCC is "asserting itself to deny this reality
to us."'25 He added, "if the FCC believes an eight or ten year old child hasn't
seen a bare buttocks or hasn't used a four letter word, the FCC is living back in
1872, or 1772." '26 In his book, Lewis acknowledges that critics are "right to
worry about the flood of pornography and the general coarsening of our socie-
ties."'27 But he nonetheless concludes that the "bluenoses who kept Americans
from reading [Ulysses by James] Joyce and [Lady Chatterley's Lover by D.H.]
Lawrence made censorship intellectually unacceptable, and attempts to draw a
line somewhere else-by judges and politicians-[do] not work."'28
V. A FIRST AMENDMENT SKEPTIC, NOT ABSOLUTIST
Despite such traditionally "liberal" pronouncements on the First Amend-
ment, however, Lewis is not a First Amendment absolutist or "literalist," as
former Justice Hugo Black has been described.'29 Lewis recognizes the occa-
Coincidentally, the Second Circuit's decision issued later on the same day the FCC's
Daily Digest announced it had amended its rules to implement the Broadcast Decency
Enforcement Act, by revising the provision that establishes the maximum possible for-
feitures for various offenses to reflect a tenfold increase in maximum fine for inde-
cency violations to $325,000 per violation up to a maximum of $3,000,000 for any sin-
gle act.
Id.
123 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 140.
124 C-SPAN Interview, supra note 17.
125 Id; see also In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning their
February 25, 2003 Broadcast of the Program "NYPD Blue," Forfeiture Order, FCC 08-55
(Feb. 19, 2008), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-08-55A I .pdf.
126 C-SPAN Interview, supra note 17.
127 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 141.
128 Id.
129 See MARC A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON & LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY, MASS
MEDIA LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 29 (7th ed. 2005) (describing Justice Black's literal,
absolutist approach to the First Amendment); see also Edmund Cahn, Justice Black and
First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 554 (1962)
("[The First Amendment] says 'no law,' and that is what I believe it means." (quoting Jus-
tice Black in an interview)). Franklin noted, "the only restrictions that Justice Black be-
lieved permissible under the First Amendment were incidental restrictions on the time,
place, and manner of an individual's freedom of expression." FRANKLIN, supra, at 29. But as
Franklin further notes:
Even Justice Black found himself forced to narrow the scope of what counts as speech
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sional need to balance the free speech and press values of the First Amendment
against other societal values such as the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial,
or the protection of personal privacy and reputation.'3 ° Entitling one of his
book chapters "Balancing Interests," Lewis notes that "[p]eople invoke 'the
First Amendment' as if those words would settle whatever issue was being
debated. But in truth the freedoms of speech and of the press have never been
absolutes. The courts and society have repeatedly struggled to accommodate
other interests along with those."'
' 3
1
A. Press Shield Laws
Consider, for example, one of Lewis's own "struggles" in the book and his
unorthodox position on "reporter's privilege" and "shield" laws.'32 These laws,
in order to reach the "correct" result in a speech case. In Cohen v. California, Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justice Black, argued that the state could punish one of its citizens
for wearing a jacket that said "Fuck the Draft." According to Justice Black, wearing a
jacket expressing this sentiment was not speech but physical conduct that a state could
legitimately regulate.
Id (citing 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, with Black, J. joining)). Frank-
lin adds that "[t]he literal approach did not allow Justice Black to balance the State's inter-
ests against the right to freedom of expression. Thus, he was forced to resort to strained
reasoning to avoid what to him was an unacceptable outcome." Id. Black also dissented in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, another free speech case
involving protesting young people and the Vietnam War. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (upholding the right of students to wear a black arm band to school in protest of
the Vietnam War as long as such protest did not disrupt school discipline or the educational
process). In his dissent, Black peevishly criticized the Court for "subject[ing] all the public
schools in the country to the whims and caprices of their loudest-mouthed, but maybe not
their brightest, students." Id. at 525.
130 For an excellent book on balancing free speech on the Internet and personal privacy
and exploring "the profound implications of the online collision between free speech and
privacy," see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRI-
VACY ON THE INTERNET 205 (2007). A law professor at George Washington University, Pro-
fessor Solove examines such issues as "the virtues and vices of gossip and shaming, the
effect of new technologies on the spread of information, and the ways in which law, tech-
nology, and norms interact." Id. Solove also evaluates the need for new legal protections in
a new media age of blogs, chatrooms, and online discussion groups as well as "cyberbully-
ing" and "Internet vigilantism" when everyone can write and "publish" but not everyone
considers, or can be held accountable for, what they write and distribute over cyberspace. Id.
131 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 169.
132 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that reporters do not have a
press privilege to withhold testimony from a grand jury). For contrasting arguments on a
Federal shield law, absent a Supreme Court decision to protect the confidentiality ofjoural-
ists' sources, compare Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Shield Law Perils, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2007, at
A25, and Theodore Olson, . .. Or Safeguards?, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2007, at A25. For a
summary of the more than thirty state shield laws as well as lower court cases upholding at
least a qualified form of reporter's privilege, see Bill Kenworthy, State Shield Statutes &
Leading Cases, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., Oct. 17, 2005,
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common in most of the states but yet to be enacted on the Federal level, would
protect reporters in many, but rarely all, instances from revealing their confi-
dential sources in civil or criminal cases. Press advocates likely will disagree
with Lewis's surprising skepticism about the necessity for, or efficacy of, these
press shield laws like the one currently pending in Congress.'33 Lewis entitles
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/press/topic.aspx?topic=shield laws; see also Report-
ers Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Privilege Compendium, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege
(last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
133 See Free Flow of Information Act, H.R. 2102 & S. 2035 (giving journalists for the
first time a qualified, Federal statutory privilege not to disclose confidential sources in court
proceedings, with exceptions for information needed to prevent terrorism or significant
harm to national security, that would prevent "imminent death" or significant bodily injury,
that relates to a significant trade secret, or leaks of personal or financial information re-
vealed in violation of existing Federal laws). The House of Representatives passed H.R.
2102 on October 16, 2007, by a vote of 398-21. 156 CONG. REC. H 11603 (daily ed. Oct. 16,
2007). The Senate Committee on the Judiciary favorably reported S. 2035 to the Senate
Calendar on October 22, 2007, by a roll call vote of 15-2. However, the bill has yet to be
scheduled for Senate floor consideration. The Bush Administration opposes enactment of
the legislation, but has not yet indicated whether President Bush would veto the legislation
if both the House and Senate passed the bill. See 156 CONG. REC. HI 1595 (daily ed. Oct. 16,
2007). Robert D. Novak, the conservative columnist published in the Washington Post,
wrote in an April 17, 2007 column that President Bush, "not just inflexible Justice Depart-
ment lawyers" has indicated his personal opposition to a Federal press shield law. To No-
vak, the opposition of "Bush and the Senate Republican leadership raises questions as to
whether the [Republican] Grand Old Party stands for limited government or, in its pursuit of
global terrorism, disdain for constitutional liberties." See Robert D. Novak, On the Shield
Law, Good News and Bad, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2008, at A23. For more information on
the issue of reporter's privilege and the status of the pending Federal shield legislation, in-
cluding conflicting definitions of "journalist" under the pending House and Senate bills, see
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press Home Page, www.rcfp.org (last visited Apr.
15, 2008). See also Advertisement, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2008, at A14 (urging the Senate
to pass S. 2035, and signed by sixty-four leading news and media organizations, including
ABC News, Associated Press, CNN, Hearst Co., National Press Club, National Public Ra-
dio, the News Corporation, New York Times Co., Washington Post Co., and U.S. News and
World Report). The advertisement declares that:
Hauling journalists to jail or personally bankrupting them to reveal their confidential
sources is not the American way. Our country spends millions of dollars promoting a
free and vibrant press abroad, but here at home the press is under fire from prosecutors
and civil litigants chilling the free flow of information to the American public. ...
There are times when the compelled disclosure of a confidential source's identity may
be necessary for national security, personal safety and law enforcement reasons. S.
2035, the "Free Flow of Information Act," carves out exceptions to appropriately bal-
ance these legitimate concerns. S. 2035 is NOT an absolute privilege, but carefully bal-
ances the public interest in compelling disclosure and the public interest in gathering
news and maintaining the free flow of information.
Id. But for a more skeptical journalist's perspective on the pending Federal shield law, see
Jack Shafer, We Don't Need No Stinkin' Shield Law, SLATE, Apr. 16, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2189186 (arguing that the limited number of media subpoenas the
Department of Justice has issued under its current guidelines has been "hardly a landslide"
of sixty-five between 2001 and 2006, that "the current legal ambiguities and discretionary
guidelines may actually benefit the press," while "legally codifying the process of subpoe-
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his chapter on this issue, "A Press Privilege?"'' Acknowledging that the press
has a genuine interest in maintaining its ability to use confidential sources,
Lewis would balance that concern in civil cases against "the interest of the per-
son whose good name has been sullied."' 35 He asks: "[w]ould we want to de-
prive someone whose reputation has been trashed by an anonymous source of
any real chance of repairing that reputation in court?"' 3 6 Lewis answers that he
would not. '37
As for "shield" laws giving journalists a Federal, statutory testimonial privi-
lege they have yet to obtain in the Federal courts, Lewis notes they "do not
dispose of all the doubts about exempting journalists from the universal citi-
zens' duty to testify in court when called."'3 Lewis illustrates those doubts by
detailing the case of Wen Ho Lee, a nuclear scientist at the Los Alamos Na-
tional Laboratory:
[He] was described in various press stories in the late 1990s as an atomic spy. The sto-
ries, evidently a result of leaks from government sources, said Lee was suspected of
giving secrets to China. He was arrested, charged with fifty-nine felony counts, and
held for nine months in solitary confinement. Then the government dropped all but
one of the counts, a charge that he mishandled information that had been retroactively
classified as "secret." The judge handling the case apologized to Lee and said officials
had "embarrassed our entire nation and each of us who is a citizen of it." A Boston
Globe editorial said the suspicions about Lee came from an intelligence official "with
a reputation for right-wing zealotry and racist behavior."
Lee sued the government for violation of his privacy in the leaks to the press. His
lawyers subpoenaed five reporters and asked about the sources of their stories. They
refused to answer, and they were held in contempt and ordered to pay fines of $500 a
day until they agreed to respond. Then five news organizations-ABC News, the Los
Angeles Times, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Associated Press-
settled the case and ended the contempt sanctions by agreeing to pay Lee $750,000.
The government also contributed $895,000 toward his lawyers' fees and taxes.
In settling the case, the news organizations made no apology for their contemptible
treatment of Wen Ho Lee. They said they agreed to settle "to protect our journalists
from further sanctions" and to protect their ability to obtain information that can come
"only from confidential sources." In other words: We don't care what we did to Wen
Ho Lee; we care about our own needs. The Boston Globe, which had not been part of
the attack on Lee, saw the real situation in an editorial on the settlement. It said: "it is
important to remember what was done to Lee because powerful institutions rarely
admit abuse of their powers, and because the rule of law is imperiled when the gov-
ernment and a compliant or gullible press tramples on the rights of a single private
citizen."39
naing journalists" could mainly benefit the "corporate press" and "lead to the licensing of
journalists"); see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2007).
134 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 8 1-100.
135 Id. at 83.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 91.
139 Id. at 92-93.
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After this detailed telling of Lee's story, Lewis asks:
Suppose that a federal shield law had existed when Wen Ho Lee sued to seek some
compensation for his nightmare ordeal. The journalists who wrote the damaging sto-
ries would have had their subpoenas dismissed, and without the names of the leakers
Lee would probably have had to give up his lawsuit. Is that what a decent society
should want? Would that have really benefited the press? Or would it have added to
the evident public feeling that the press is arrogant, demanding special treatment?
40
To Lewis, "the press, as James Madison told us long ago, can be a crucial
force in countering abuse of official power. But it is not always the good guy.
It can be a compliant or gullible handmaiden of government abuse."'' And
with "ethical and other compelling interests on both sides of the privilege is-
sue," Lewis believes journalists should be more "cautious in relying on un-
named sources in what they write," especially when quoting anonymous
sources with pejorative comments on individuals.
42
Lewis also correctly points out that the constitutional claim for special
treatment of journalists in the courts is "difficult to sustain.' ' 43 The Supreme
Court, he correctly notes, "has shown no interest in reexamining the issue"
since its 1972 decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, which rejected a reporter's
privilege to withhold grand jury testimony. ' Lewis adds that "the chance [the
Court] will read the First Amendment to give journalists a testimonial privilege
is zero.
140 Id. at 93.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 96.
143 Id. at 97.
144 Id. at 96 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
145 Id. at 96-97. Lewis explains that:
The trouble with the constitutional claim is that it fits awkwardly with the general
course of First Amendment decisions on the freedom of the press. Starting in 1931, the
Supreme Court largely immunized the press from prior restraints (in Near v. Minne-
sota) and subsequent penalties for what it published (in New York Times v. Sullivan). It
hardly ever read the First Amendment as assuring the acquisition of information, and
then only when the complaint was against closed courtrooms. And in those courtroom
cases the Supreme Court gave no special access to the press, deciding rather that court-
rooms must be open to the public at large. To prevail with its constitutional argument
on the privilege issue, the press would have to persuade the Supreme Court to take two
new steps: First, it would have to decide that the First Amendment gives the press
(however defined) access to information not given to the public, and then it would have
to decide that keeping sources secret is crucial to that access.
Journalists and their lawyers often speak as if the First Amendment, in guaranteeing the
freedom of "the press," protected an institution-the organized press. Indeed, Justice
Stewart made that assumption in a lecture. But in the eighteenth century there was
nothing like the organized press institutions that developed later. In promising "the
freedom of speech, or of the press," the amendment surely meant merely to cover both
oral and written expression: pamphlets and books just as much as newspapers. Once
the premise of a specially protected institution is put aside, the constitutional claim for
special treatment of journalists in the courts becomes more difficult to sustain.
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This suggests to Lewis that the question of a testimonial privilege for jour-
nalists is more one of public policy than of constitutional law. And the policy
he supports relies on a testimonial privilege statute Congress enacted in 1975
to authorize the federal courts to adopt a qualified federal privilege for journal-
ists. 46 Lewis cites approvingly in this regard a concurring opinion issued in
2005 by D.C. Circuit Judge David Tatel, in the contempt proceedings of Judith
Miller of The New York Times and Matt Cooper of Time.'47 Judge Tatel pro-
posed a special balancing test to resolve the free press-fair trial conflicts that
have frequently arisen in recent years. Under his test, Judge Tatel would
"weigh the interest in compelling disclosure, measured by the harm the leak
caused, against the public interest in newsgathering, measured by the leaked
information's value."' 48 For example, "if the government wanted to learn who
leaked the story of President Bush's order for wiretapping without required
warrants, a court would weigh the harm caused by that leak against the impor-
Id.; see also Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975) (excerpting an
address on November 2, 1974, at the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation, in
which Justice Stewart argued that the "free press guarantee" in the First Amendment is a
separate, "structural provision of the Constitution" the primary purpose of which is "to cre-
ate a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the three official
branches"). Lewis notes this is "especially important in matters of national security" where
the "Congress and the courts tend to defer to the [P]resident." LEWIS, supra note 1, at 147.
146 See Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (enacting FED. R. EViD. 501).
147 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005), reissued as amended with redactions of classified filings by
the Special Prosecutor, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tatel, J., concurring). As Judge
Tatel explains in his concurring opinion:
In 1975-three years after Branzburg-Congress enacted Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, authorizing federal courts to develop evidentiary privileges in fed-
eral question cases according to "the principles of the common law as they may be in-
terpreted.., in the light of reason and experience." Given Branzburg's instruction that
"Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is neces-
sary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed
necessary to deal with the evil discerned," Rule 501's delegation of congressional au-
thority requires that we look anew at the "necess[ity] and desirab[ility]" of the reporter
privilege-though from a common law perspective.
Id. at 988-89 (citations omitted). The Miller case arose when a Federal court found reporters
Judith Miller, New York Times, and Matthew Cooper, Time, in civil contempt for refusing to
give evidence by disclosing confidential sources in response to grand jury subpoenas. These
were issued by Special Prosecutor, Patrick Fitzgerald, as part of his criminal investigation
into the leaking of the identity of Valerie Plame, a former operative with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and wife of former Ambassador and Iraq War critic, Joseph Wilson, by Lewis
"Scooter" Libby, former Chief of Staff to Vice President Dick Cheney, and later convicted
of perjury. Miller spent eighty-five days in jail until Libby "assured her in a telephone call..
. that a waiver he gave prosecutors authorizing them to question reporters about their con-
versations with him was not coerced." Susan Schmidt & Jim VandeHei, N.Y. Times Re-
porter Released From Jail, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at AO1.
14s LEWIS, supra note 1, at 98 (citing Judith Miller, 397 F.3d at 998).
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tance of the information to the public."'49 In Lewis's opinion, "the latter would
plainly prevail, and the reporters would have a privilege not to disclose their
sources.'
5 0
Lewis concludes his "Press Privilege?" chapter by noting that the press
should take the Miller case and Judge Tatel's concurrence "as a warning
against pressing its claims too far and separating itself from the mainstream of
the law and public opinion."''
B. Hate Speech
Lewis also examines "American tolerance for hateful speech"'52 against
blacks, homosexuals, Jews, Muslims, or other minority groups. He writes, for
example, about Collin v. Smith, in which the Seventh Circuit ultimately de-
clared unconstitutional an ordinance designed to stop a threatened Nazi march
in Skokie, Illinois, a community with a large number of Holocaust survivors." 3
Lewis notes that in Canada, as well as in Germany, Austria, and other Euro-
pean countries, it is a crime to deny the fact of the Holocaust, as David Irving,
"a notorious, English Holocaust denier," learned in 2006 when he went to
prison for thirteen months in Austria. "4 In the United States, however, "the
149 Id. at 98-99.
150 Id. at 99. Ironically, in applying his proposed test to the facts of Judith Miller, Judge
Tatel concluded that neither Miller nor Cooper deserved a testimonial privilege regarding
the leaking of the identity of CIA operative, Vatlerie Plame. He concluded his very thought-
ful opinion by stating:
Were the leak at issue in this case less harmful to national security or more vital to pub-
lic debate, or had the special counsel failed to demonstrate the grand jury's need for the
reporters' evidence, I might have supported the motion to quash. Because identifying
appellants' sources instead appears essential to remedying a serious breach of public
trust, I join in affirming the district court's orders compelling their testimony.
Judith Miller, 397 F. 3d at 1004.
151 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 100.
152 Id. at 160; see also RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
(2006). Krotoszynski is a professor of law at Washington and Lee University School of
Law. His book offers a comparative law perspective on free speech in other democracies,
including Canada, England, Germany, and Japan, all of which have less tolerance for hate
speech than the United States. In Germany, for example, for obvious historical reasons,
"human dignity, not freedom of speech, is the preeminent constitutional value," its Basic
Law mandates balancing free expression with other social interests such as banning Holo-
caust denial and the display of Nazi symbols, and unlike the United States, also protects free
expression against violations by private parties as well as by government officials. See Kyu
Ho Youm, University of Oregon, School of Journalism and Communication, Book Review,
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/kroto 106.htm.
153 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 159-60, 162-63 (citing Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir. 1978).
154 Id. at 161.
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First Amendment protects the right to deny the fact of the Holocaust."' 55 Lewis
quotes a French jurist explaining that this American tolerance may be based on
our "inveterate social and historical optimism-which Europeans could not be
expected to share after their tragic experience at the hands of the Nazis and
Communists."'56 Lewis believes that "every society has to be its own judge of
these matters."' 57 The Germans, for example, cannot be as self-confident about
brushing off hate mongers as just part of the "lunatic fringe" "because they
lived through somebody who started in a Munich beer hall and killed six mil-
lion people."'58 As for Lewis, he finds it "painful to protect" hate speech but
"grits [his] teeth" to do so. " Lewis agrees with The Economist that "criminal-
izing Holocaust denial and other forms of racist speech.., could be interpreted
to punish or restrain speech that 'merely causes offense,"' and "'in the name of
stopping bigots, one may end up by stopping all criticism.""1
60
According to some, the reason to permit hateful speech is "that it makes the
rest of us aware of terrible beliefs and strengthens our resolve to combat
them." ' 6' To counter this argument, Lewis quotes another English source, Jer-
emy Waldron, a professor of law and philosophy. Waldron tells us:
The costs of hate speech ... are not spread evenly across the community that is sup-
posed to tolerate them. The [racists] of the world may not harm the people who call
for their toleration, but then few of them are depicted as animals in posters plastered
around Leamington Spa [an English town]. We should speak to those who are de-
picted in this way, or those whose suffering or whose parents' suffering is mocked by
the [Skokie neo-Nazis] before we conclude that tolerating this sort of speech builds
character [or presumably educates or motivates the rest of us to resist it].' 62
C. Dangerous, Imminent Violence Speech
Lewis is much more skeptical and ambivalent, however, about the toleration
of "genuinely dangerous" hate speech that has intensified "with the rise of Is-
lamic extremism and terrorist acts at the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury."'63 He cites the British example where "[a] number of imams allegedly
urged violent jihad in sermons in their mosques" and one Muslim leader in
155 Id. at 157-58.
156 Id. at 160.
157 C-SPAN Interview, supra note 17.
158 See BUZZFLASH INTERVIEW, supra note 2. The phrase "lunatic fringe" was coined by
Theodore Roosevelt and is a "derogatory name for the extreme radical members of a
group." NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY (3d ed. 2002), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/59/4/lunaticfring.html.
159 C-SPAN Interview, supra note 17.
160 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 161 (quoting The Economist).
161 Id. at 162.
162 Id. at 162-63.
163 Id. at 161, 167.
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Britain said it was "legitimate to attack British soldiers and policemen" be-
cause Britain was allied with America fighting Muslims in Iraq and Afghani-
stan." Then in July 2005, four Muslims suicide bombers killed fifty-two peo-
ple in a terrorist attack aimed at London's public transportation system.
65
Later, another British Islamic militant was arrested and charged with encourag-
ing terrorism after a number of speeches, including one in which he described
the July 2005 attack as "praiseworthy.' 66
Lewis notes that "the great statement of reasons for allowing even the most
noxious speech was made by Brandeis" in his famous Whitney opinion: "Dis-
cussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine . . . [and] [t]he fitting remedy for evil counsels is good
ones." 67 But Lewis points out that "[i]n an age when words have inspired acts
of mass murder and terrorism," in America and Britain as well as in Rwanda,
where radio broadcasts in 1994 urged the majority Hutus to slaughter the mi-
nority Tutsis and over 500,000 were massacred in the genocide, "it is not as
easy for [him] as it once was to believe that the only remedy for evil counsels,
in Brandeis's phrase, should be good ones."'66
Lewis further notes that "even the Supreme Court's highly tolerant decision
in Brandenburg v. Ohio would allow legal action against speech that is in-
tended to incite imminent lawlessness and is likely to do so."'69 However,
Lewis finds the Brandenburg imminence requirement "inappropriate," given
the context-a call for the murder of police and other officials in Britain fol-
lowed by an actual terrorist bombing in London murdering over fifty civil-
ians.' Lewis concludes instead that "we should be able to punish speech that
urges terrorist violence to an audience some of whose members are ready to act
on the urging.""' For Lewis, and possibly many of his American and British
readers, "[t]hat is imminence enough.' ' 2
164 Id. at 161.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 162.
167 Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927)).
168 Id. at 166.
169 Id. at 162 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
170 Id.
17' Id. at 167.
172 Id.; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting, joined by Brandeis, J.) ("Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous
to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweep-
ing command, 'Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech."'). The ques-
tions always remain, however, who decides whether an emergency exists to justify abridg-




VI. THE FUTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: MEETING
CHALLENGES WITH COURAGE
How will we meet such free expression challenges as "genuinely dangerous"
speech leading to "terrorist violence," and the other challenges Lewis identi-
fies?"' Freedom for the Thought That We Hate concludes with Lewis calling
for both civic and judicial courage.'74 "Even in a country with constitutional
guarantees of freedom, something more is needed to resist fear and its manipu-
lators," Lewis writes, and "[t]hat is courage.""' Only such courage, he argues,
"will preserve a free society in an age of international threats and of govern-
ments ready to use them to advance their own power."' 76 "The courage re-
quired in a free society," he explains, "is not alone of those who believe in
change, but of journalists and other shapers of opinion."'77 He calls on the
press to continue exercising their important "checking value," which involves
"pointing to, and correcting, abuses of official power."'78 This value "has be-
come crucial," Lewis notes, "as the imperial pretensions of the executive
branch of government have grown ever greater."' 79 He states that:
When President George W. Bush took the United States to war in Iraq on false prem-
ises, and then secretly ordered the wiretapping of Americans in violation of law and
claimed the right to torture detainees, Congress seemed unable or unwilling to per-
173 In his book, Lewis examines other First Amendment challenges, especially when
"freedom of expression [is] in tension with other important interests," such as "the effort to
square freedom of the press with protection of the right to a fair trial," "the effort to limit the
corrupting effect of financing political campaigns," and balancing free expression against
maintaining personal privacy and the "right to be let alone." LEWIS, supra note 1, at 68-69,
80, 169, 177. In his C-SPAN Interview, Lewis also touches upon American corporations
using the First Amendment to advance their own commercial interests, for example, by
relying on First Amendment arguments to deregulate the media and telecommunications
industries. See C-SPAN Interview, supra note 17. However, he does not challenge their
right to do so, noting that under the First Amendment "that's the game," and that corporate
reliance on free speech arguments to achieve greater media deregulation and ownership
consolidation, at least for liberal media critics like Lewis, may just be a more recent exam-
ple of "freedom for the thought that we hate." Id. Lewis also discussed whether the First
Amendment can continue to advance in America in our current culture so "trivialized by and
fixated on entertainment, celebrity, and amusing ourselves to death." Id.; see, e.g., NEIL
POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF SHOW Busi-
NESS (1985). In the C-SPAN Interview, Lewis said this is a "profound question," but he
remains optimistic the First Amendment will prosper, as long as we continue to think and
read and debate, and recall the examples of legal giants like Holmes and Brandeis who teach
us that "words can still make a difference." C-SPAN Interview, supra note 17. "We
shouldn't surrender to the idea that it's hopeless." Id.
174 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 186, 188.
175 Id. at 128.
176 Id. at 188.
177 Id. at 187.
178 Id. at 186.
179 Id.
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form the checking role that Madison and the other framers of the Constitution had en-
visaged. It was the press that eventually penetrated the secrecy and exposed the
abuses.'
As for judicial courage, Lewis believes that at least beginning in the twenti-
eth century, "[m]any of the great advances in the quality-the decency-of
American society were initiated by judges: on racial justice, on respect for the
equal humanity of women and homosexuals, on freedom of speech itself."''
And each of these steps "exposed judges to bitter words and, sometimes,
physical danger."'82 But this "judicial boldness--of courage," and the legal
decisions it produced, "made the country what it is."' 83
The question remains what the future holds for the First Amendment. One
cannot help but wonder whether it is safe in view of the current 5-4 conserva-
tive majority of the Roberts Court which has started to overturn Court prece-
dents. 8 4 Despite the Court "revers[ing] itself more often lately than in earlier
years," Lewis thinks the First Amendment and its legal progeny are in no simi-
lar danger of reversal. Since the "ascendancy of the First Amendment" over the
past eighty years, beginning with Near v. Minnesota in 1931, the Supreme
180 Id.
181 Id. at 187.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 188.
184 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Precedents Begin to Fallfor Roberts Court, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/2 I/washington/2 I memo.html ("The ques-
tion is not whether the Roberts court will overturn more precedents [beyond the two it over-
turned in the 2006-2007 Court term], but how often, by what standard and in what terms.");
Barnes, supra note 97 ("[Wisconsin Right to Life] brought the fourth dissent read from the
bench this year by a member of the court's liberal wing, which is eager to draw attention to
what it says is a majority too willing to jettison the court's past rulings. 'The court (and I
think, the country) loses when important precedent is overruled without good reason, and
there is no justification for departure from our usual rule of stare decisis here,' Justice David
H. Souter wrote for the other dissenters in the case, Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer."); Epps, supra note 99 (noting that the Wisconsin Right to
Life and Morse decisions "provide an example of how the new justices, John Roberts and
Samuel Alito, operate. Both proclaimed themselves respectful of precedent; and unlike Jus-
tices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, they did not go in for the wholesale overruling
of precedents they dislike. Instead. . . .they have chosen to narrowly interpret previous
cases, until in the end there is almost nothing left of them. Think of it as a soothing way of
diminishing liberal precedent, slice by tiny slice. But the direction is clear, and we should
not be confused about where this court is taking us. 'Reason by degrees submits to absurd-
ity,' Samuel Johnson once wrote, 'as the eye is in time accommodated to darkness."'); see
also Charles Whitebread, The Conservative Kennedy Court-What a Difference a Single
Justice Can Make: the 2006-2007 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 29 WHITTIER
L. REV. 1, 145 (2007) ("In what may signal a real shift to the right, the new Chief Justice led
a robust and confident conservative majority that prevailed in nearly every significant deci-
sion this term. Without doubt, the Supreme Court is a far more conservative place today
than two years ago. As ideological shifts go, the Court's rightward tilt was not total, but it
was demonstrable and decisive on .. .free speech .... It remains to be seen if this clear
trend continues and only Justice Anthony Kennedy can answer that question.").
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Court, Lewis concludes, "has not changed its mind about the central impor-
tance of freedom of speech or of the press. The abortion decision, Roe v. Wade,
has been whittled away; but New York Times v. Sullivan and other landmarks
of free expression stand unchanged."'' 5
But is Lewis's faith in the courts to defend, and even advance, the First
Amendment too optimistic, or even old fashioned? Some critics may think
so;86 however, I do not. For Lewis is right, I believe, that with long tenures
and "bound by their commissions to look beyond momentary partisan con-
flicts," judges "are in the best position to give voice to [our] deeper values." '87
And essential to these values are the free expression clauses of the First
Amendment: "Congress shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press."'8 8
VII. CONCLUSION
Will these values and the landmark Supreme Court decisions embodying
them continue to guide us? And will the courts continue to defend and enforce
the fourteen words of the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment to
our Constitution? Neither Tony Lewis nor anyone else can issue any guaran-
tees. But if the First Amendment is not only to survive but also thrive in the
rest of the twenty-first century and beyond, Lewis would no doubt urge judges
185 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 181 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
186 For a more critical view of Lewis's optimism, see Jeffrey Rosen, Say What You Will,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, at 1 (Book Review), Rosen argues, "the rise of new technologies
[like the Internet] suggests that the free speech battles of the future may . . .pit telecom
corporations against private speakers, leaving judges on the sidelines," as the fight is over
"open access rules of 'net neutrality' requiring telcos to make their services available to all
speakers on equal terms." Id. Rosen believes this is a regulatory and policy issue more likely
to be resolved by Congress and the FCC than by the courts. Rosen also asserts that the "he-
roic First Amendment tradition" that Lewis so eloquently presents in his latest book as well
as represents in his entire journalism career "may seem like a noble vision from a distant
era" in the face of the modem milieu where "everyone with a modem is a potential journal-
ist," public discourse becomes "more brutal and invasive at the same time," and "less ame-
nable to judicial oversight." Id.
187 LEWIS, supra note 1, at xii.
188 Chief Justice Roberts has also expressed his support for "an independent judiciary
willing to protect unpopular speech through decisions enforcing the First Amendment."
Tony Mauro, Roberts: Strong Courts Essential for Free Speech, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR.,
Sept. 20, 2007, www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=19071 (reporting a speech by
Roberts at Syracuse University dedicating a new building of the Newhouse School of Public
Communications, which is "wrapped in the 45 words of the First Amendment, etched in
glass"). "The First Amendment has become a powerful restraint on government only be-
cause of judicial rulings, Roberts suggested." Id. The Chief Justice also noted that "[t]here
can be little doubt that the First Amendment would be the first victim should the independ-
ence of our judiciary be curtailed." ld.
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to recall the bracing words of Justice Brandeis that "courage [is] the secret of
liberty."'89 And he would remind the rest of us to recall the equally stirring
words of Justice Black that "to preserve democracy," we must all summon and
display the "courage to be free." 9
189 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring, joined by
Holmes, J.), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 n.2, 449 (1969); see also
supra notes 42, 167-69 and accompanying text.
190 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 162 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting), rh'g
denied, 361 U.S. 854 (1959); see also supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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